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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WEST GALLERY CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, dba 
GALLERY THEATERS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, et. al., 
Case No. 15749 
Defendants-Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was an action brought pursuant to Rules 57 and 
65 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to declare respondents' 
suspension of appellant's business, theater and soft drink 
licenses invalid and to arrest the implementation of the 
suspension. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter came on for hearing before the District 
Court on appellant's motion for summary judgment. The 
District Court, with the concurrence of the parties, deter-
mined that no facts were in issue and entered an order 
denying appellant's motion and further denying appellant's 
petition for extraordinary relief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the Order of the 
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District Court with direction to grant appellant 
extraordi:., 
relief necessary to protect its rights under the F' irst Amer.: 
ment to the United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 5, 197 6, the then president of plaintiff 
corporation, James Piepenburg, was convicted in the Distric: 
Court of exhibiting an obscene motion picture, "Mernorhs 
Within Miss Aggie", in violation of §32-3-10 of the Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City. On August 25, 1976, the plai:' 
corporation was convicted in Salt Lake City Court of exhibit· 
ing an obscene motion picture, "Teenage Cover Girls", in vi:· 
lation of the same ordinance. 
On September 2, 197 6, the Mayor and the Board of Commi1 
sioners, acting through the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office 
served notice upon the plaintiff to appear before the Board 
Commissioners on October 7, 1976, in a matter termed "Order 
to Show Cause". This notice stated that the hearing was to 
be conducted pursuant to §20-3-9 and §20-20-11 of the Re-
vised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, which purport to authori 
the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City to revoke the 
business licenses of any persons whom the Commission finds 
has violated any ordinance of Salt Lake City or whom the 
Commission finds to have been convicted for any such violati 
-2-
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The grounds for revocation were the aforementioned convictions. 
A hearing was held on October 9, 1977, before the 
defendant Board of Commissioners and the Board entered Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Decision suspending plain-
tiff's licenses for nine (9) months. The effect of the 
suspension has been stayed pursuant to an agreement of counsel 
and an Order of the United States District Court until such 
time as this case is resolved. 
Plaintiff-appellant brought this action, at the sugges-
tion of the U. S. District Court, seeking to have the sus-
pension declared invalid and its implementation arrested. 
A number of grounds were alleged, however, the issues were 
narrowed in the District Court below to the single issue . 
raised by this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS A CITY FROM SUP-
PRESSING, BY MEANS OF LICENSE SUSPENSION, 
THE EXHIBITION OF FILMS WHICH ARE NOT 
OBSCENE BASED UPON CONVICTIONS OF THE 
EXHIBITOR OF EXHIBITING OTHER FILMS WHICH 
WERE FOUND TO BE OBSCENE. 
The applicable sections of the Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake City provide: 
§20-20-1. Theater or hall operation. License 
required. It shall be unlawful for any person 
to operate any theater, motion picture show, 
concert hall or other place of amusement 
not otherwis~ licensed by this Title with-
out first obtaining a license to do so. 
-3-
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§20-20-11. Obscene Films Prohibited. It 
shall be unlawful for any person to hold, 
conduct, or carry on or permit to be held 
con~u~t~d, or carried on any motion pictu;e, 
ex~ibit~on, or entertainment of any sort 
which violates Chapter 2, Section 10 or 
Chapter 7, Section 7 of Title 32, or' 
Chapter 20, Section 18.l of Title 20 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
1965, as amended. Upon a finding by the 
Board of Salt Lake City Commissioners of a 
violation after hearing, or upon a conviction 
of any person of the aforesaid violations 
occurring in or on premises licensed under 
Chapter 20 of this Title, the Board of Com-
missioners of Salt Lake City may revoke or 
suspend the license or licenses covering 
businesses conducted on such premises, re-
gardless of the license ownership thereof. 
It is respectfully submitted that the defendants are 
acting under the color of the above City Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City to "lock up" and restrain a constitutionally gum 
teed right, i.e., freedom of speech and expression. It mus: 
be noted that defendants are not limiting their curtailment 
of plaintiff's right to exhibit films to those films which 
are "obscene", but are attempting to prohibit plaintiff fro: 
exhibiting any film. Clearly, films which have been judicia. 
determined to be obscene are not protected by the First Amer: 
ment. The issue here is whether the defendants can block 
the exhibition of material which is protected by the First 
Amendment because plaintiff has been convicted of exhibitin: 
films which were not protected. The overwhelming weight 
of authority is clearly that such action is unconstitution~ 
-4-
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The courts of this nation have universally condemned 
prior restraint of speech and press, save in the most extra-
ordinary of circumstances. In the leading United States 
supreme Court case of Near v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697, 51 
s. Ct. 625 (1931), the Court struck down a prior restraint 
very similar to that involved in the present case. The Near 
case involved a situation where a Minnesota statute provided 
for the prospective abatement of publications found to be 
either obscene or libelous, 1 based on the theory that such 
publications were enjoinable as nuisances. The lower courts 
believed that the defendant in that case had made libelous 
accusations against members of the local government, and 
thus had engaged in conduct unprotected by the First Amendment. 
Accordingly, they felt no impropriety existed in enjoining the 
1 Chapter 285 of the Session Laws of Minnesota, 1925, 
declared: 
"Section 1. Any person ..• engaged in .•• producing, 
publishing or circulating, having in possession, selling 
or giving away 
(a) an obscene, lewd and lascivisious newspaper, 
magazine or other periodical, or 
(b) a malicious, scandalous and defamatory news-
paper, magazine or other periodical; is guilty of nuisance ••• " 
Section 2 provided an injunction to abate any nuisance 
found in Section 1. 
-5-
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defendant from all future publications, since he had abused 
his First Amendment rights in the past. The United States 
Supreme Court reversed, characterizing the state's conduct 
as unconstitutional prior restraint on protected First Arnenc· 
ment rights. The Court stated: 
If we cut through mere details of pro-
cedure, the operation and effect of the 
statute in substance is that public 
authorities may bring the owner or 
publisher of a newspaper or periodical 
before a judge upon the charge of con-· 
ducting a business of publishing 
scandalous and defamatory matter ... 
and [unless innocence is proven] his 
newspaper or periodical is suppressed 
and further publication is made punish-
able as contempt. This is the essence 
of censorship. 238 U.S. at 713, 51 
s. Ct. at 630, L.Ed. at 1366. 
The Court then added: 
[T]his decision rests upon the opera-
tion and effect of the statute, with-
out regard to the question of the 
truth of the charges contained in the 
particular periodical. 238 U.S. at 
723, 51 S. Ct. at 633, 75 L.Ed. at 
1371. 
Thus, the Court made it clear that even if the defendant in' 
case had been formally convicted of abusing his First Aroendoc 
rights by making libelous statements, this would not justify 
that state in prospectively denying his right to freely expr' 
himself in the future. 
Finally, the Near Court also Pol.. nted out that comrnercia! 
entities are equally entitled to First Amendment protections 
-6-
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as non-commercial entities: 
Characterizing the publication as a 
business, and the business as a 
nuisance, does not permit an invasion 
of the constitutional immunity against 
restraint. 283 U.S. at 720. 
While the Near decision dealt with prospective re-
straints upon a newspaper publisher allegedly engaging in 
libel, more recent decisions have dealt specifically with 
the abatement of adult theaters as nuisances. With apparent 
unanimity, the state courts have found the doctrine of prior 
restraints to be entirely applicable to prevent the padlocking 
of adult theaters as nuisances after specific films were 
adjudged obscene: People ex. rel. Busch v. Projection Room 
Theater, C.3d , 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 550 P.2d 600 
(June 1, 1976); General Corp. v. Sweeton, 320 So.2d 668 
(Ala. 1975), cert.denied, U.S. , 96 S.Ct. 1494, 47 
L.Ed.2d 753 (1976); Kansas v. A Motion Picture Entitled "The 
Bet", 547 P.2d·760 (Kan. 1976); Gulf States Theaters of 
Louisiana v. Richardson, 287 So.2d 480 (La. 1974); Society to 
Oppose Pornography, Inc., vs. Thevis, 255 So.2d 876 (La. App. 
1972); Giarrusso v. D'Iberville Gallery, 295 So.2d 891 (La. 
App. 1974); New Riviera Arts Theater v. Davis, 219 Tenn. 
652, 412 S.W.2d 890 (1967). Similarly,· the doctrine of 
prior restraints has been held to preclude a state from closing 
down a bookstore as a nuisance after a finding that it had 
-7-
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sold obscene books or magazines: State ex. rel. Blee v. 
Mohoney Enterprises, 289 N.E.2d 519 (Ind. App. 1973); 
Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974)·, ~ 
ex. rel. Field v. Hess, 540 P.2d 1165 (Okla. 1975); co~. 
wealth ex. rel. Davis v. Van Emberg, 847 A2d 712 (Pa. 197)) 
The rationale underlying all these cases was perhaps be~ 
summarized in General Corporation v. Sweeton, supra. Theii 
the Alabama Supreme Court stated: 
The decree of the trial court included an 
order closing the Fox Theater for any purpose 
for one year. This is not a liquor nuisance 
nor a prostitution nuisance; rather, a movie 
house charged with showing certain obscene 
motion pictures. Evidence of obscene conduct 
in the past does not justify enjoining future 
conduct which is protected by the First Amend-
ment ... The padlocking of appellant's operation 
~one year constitutes prior restraint at 
its worst and is patently unconstitutional. 
320 So.2d at 675. (Emphasis added.) 
The Alabama Law on Obscenity ... provides criminal 
penalties for conduct such as appellant's if 
retributive punishment is sought, those sanc-
tions, not abatement, are the only proper 
ones-authorized by the legislature ... [E]ven 
if one is guilty of maintaining an obscenity 
nuisance, it is not constitutionally permis-
sible to deprive him prospectively of his 
First Amendment rights. 320 So.2d at 676. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Court went on to point out that states could constitut:: 
ally enjoin the future showing of specific individual fill!! 
found to be obscene (assuming proper procedures were used), 
they Could not blanketly close downt~ but reaffirmed that 
based on past violations of the obscenity laws. 
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The doctrine that past abuses of the First Amendment do 
not justify the suppression, via a nuisance action, of future 
distribution of materials which may or may not be obscene, was 
applied recently by the District Court of Weber County in 
Ogden City, et. al., v. Eagle Books, et. al. A copy of the 
Memorandum Decision rendered in that case by the Honorable 
Ronald O. Hyde is attached as Appendix A and clearly estab-
lishes that while an injunction can issue restraining the: dis-
tribution of specific works which have been found obscene, 
it would be unconstitutional to restrain distribution of all 
future material because the distributor had been found guilty 
of distributing obscene material in the past. 
In Speight v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 333, 94 S.Ct. 1098, 39 
L.Ed.2d 367 (1974), the United States Supreme Court clearly 
implied that it would be impermissible to close down a book-
store merely because a bookstore owner had been found to have 
sold obscene materials in violation of state law. The Speight 
case originated in a three judge federal district court in 
Georgia. The District Court had been asked to declare Georgia's 
obscenity nuisance abatement statute (which mandated the 
closure of businesses found to have violated the obscenity 
laws) an unconstitutional prior restraint on the sale of other 
books which may or may not be obscene. The district court 
abstained pursuant to the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 
-9-
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U.S. 37. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court noted 
with approval that the Georgia Supreme Court had held this:. 
nuisance statute to constitute an impermissible prior restr, 
in the case of Sanders v. State, supra, which was decided ( 
Speight was being appealed. Consequently, the Court pointe: 
out that a proper remedy was clearly available in Georgia's 
state courts and approved the District Court's decision to 
abstain. The Supreme Court characterized the Sanders caset 
this manner: 
As we understand the Georgia court's 
decision, the operation of a bookstore 
could not be enjoined merely because 
some of its merchandise had been 
judicially determined to be obscene ... 
We therefore vacate the judgment below 
and remand to the District Court for 
reconsideration in light of the decision 
of the Georgia Supreme Court in Sanders 
v. State, supra, 415 U.S. at 334-35. 
For constitutional purposes, the closing of a theater asa 
nuisance is no different from the revocation or suspension 
of the theater's license for having shown an obscene fiID. 
In both cases the ultimate result is that the theater will 
be prohibited from showing films in the future that are pre· 
sumptively protected merely because one of its past fi~s 
was adjudicated to be obscene. This is prior restraint at 
its worst. 
A number of recent cases in lower courts have dealt 
-10-
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with the precise question of whether a business license can be 
revoked or refused on the basis of a past violation of obscen-
ity laws. With only one exception, the courts have unanimously 
rejected this approach as an unconstitutional prior restraint. 
In Perrine v. Municipal Court, 5 C.3d 656, 97 Cal. Rptr. 
320, 488 P.2d 648 (1971), certiorari denied, 404 U.S. 1038, 
92 S.Ct. 710, 30 L.Ed.3d2d 729, the California Supreme court, 
sitting ~ bane, recently held that the First Amendment pro-
hibits the denial of a license to operate a bookstore to a 
man previously convicted of violating the obscenity law. In 
the Court's own words: 
[I]t is constitutionally impermissible to 
deny an applicant a license to operate a 
bookstore solely upon the ground that he has 
suffered a prior criminal conviction. 5 C3d, 
659, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 321, 488 P.2d at 649. 
The Court's reasoning, in relevant portions, is set forth below: 
[S]ince a denial of a license would prohibit 
petitioner from engaging in an activity pro-
tected by the First Amendment, it could only 
be justified, even under a narrowly drawn 
ordinance, if permitting a person who had been 
convicted of a crime involving obscenity to 
operate a bookstore constituted a clear and 
present danger of a serious substantive evil. 
[Citations omitted.] No such clear and pre-
sent danger appears ••. 
The penalty for violating sect~o~ ~11.2 
[selling, distributing, or exhib~ting obscene 
matter] does not include a forfeiture of 
First Amendment rights, and the risk that 
criminal sanctions will be insufficient to 
deter future violations of that section can-
not justify the county's attempted forfeiture 
-11-
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of those rights on the theory that past 
violators are unfit to operate bookstores. 
5 C.3d at 664-65, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 325, 
488 P.2d at 653. (Emphasis added.) 
In City of Seattle v. Bittner, 81 Wash.2d 747, 505 P, 
126 (1973), the City had denied a renewal application for 
motion picture theater license due to its finding that thE 
applicant's officers had been convicted of exhibiting obsc 
films. The Supreme Court of Washington held that the licE 
ing ordinances constituted an impermissible prior restrair 
to the extent that they prohibited the showing of any filn 
in the future, notwithstanding the prior obscenity convict 
The Court stated: 
[W]e are convinced that the constitution 
does not permit a licensing agency to 
deny to any citizen the right to exercise 
one of his fundamental freedoms on the 
ground that he has abused that freedom 
in the past. No case is cited which sup-
ports such a proposition and our research 
has revealed none. 81 Wash.2d at 756, 505 
P.2d at 131. 
In City of Delevan v. Thomas, 31 Ill.App.3d 630, 334 
NE2d 190 (1975), the defendant was convicted of operating 
business without a license after his license had been revr 
for showing an obscene motion picture. The court revers~ 
the conviction as constituting an unconstitutional prior 
restraint on protected First Amendment freedoms. In that 
case, the court found not only that premising a revocatio 
on a past conviction was impermissible, but it also found 
-12-
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that in any event, a procedure whereby the mayor of the city 
could make his own determination of obscenity violated con-
stitutionally protected procedural safeguards as well. The 
court summarized the inherent evil in this situation as fol-
lows: 
The licensing regulation in the case before 
us is an obvious attempt to prevent defendant 
from showing all future films, whether ob-
scene or not, by means of a license revoca-
tion predicated on an administrative deter-
mination that one obscene film was shown ... 
This scheme is ... fatally defective as an 
attempt at censorship ... 334 NE2d at 193. 
In Avon 42nd Street Corporation v. Myerson, 352 F.Supp. 
994 (S.D. N.Y. 1972), a federal district court struck down 
a city licensing ordinance which permitted revocation of a 
theater license upon a conviction for showing an obscene 
motion picture. The court held: 
To permit the suspension of a theater on 
the basis of a prior conviction even for 
obscenity, amounts to an unconstitutional 
suppression of protected freedom of expres-
sion. 352 F.Supp. at 998. 
Finally, in Alexander v. City of St. Paul, 227 NW2d 370 
(Minn. 1975), the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a city 
ordinance permitting the revocation of a theater license 
based on a conviction of exhibiting obscene materials. The 
court's opinion reflected a comprehensive analysis and some 
of its rationale is set forth below: 
It has been suggested that the power of 
-13-
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.... 
the c~ty t<? grant or deny a license to operate 
a motion picture theater is coextensive with 
the power of the city to grant or deny a lice 
to operate any other legitimate business. Pro~se 
ponents of this argument point to the fact 
that the city may deny a license to sell liquor 
or to operate a massage parlor to an applicant 
who has been convicted of a crime bearing a 
reasonable relationship to the business for 
which the license is sought. They argue by 
analogy that the city may also deny a license 
to operate a motion picture theater to a ap-
plicant who has been convicted of a crime re-
lating to obscenity. However, when the city 
licenses a motion picture theater, it is 
licensing an activity protected by the First 
Amendment, and as a result, the power of the 
city is more limited than when the city 
licenses activities which do not have First 
Amendment protection, such as the business of 
selling liquor or running a massage parlor. 
227 NW2d at 372-73 (Emphasis added.) 
The court went on to hold that the city's license revocatit 
ordinance was an unconstitutional prior restraint. The cor 
cited a long list of cases in support of its holding and fo: 
only one case holding to the contrary, that being Forsyth 
Corp. v. Bishop, 362 F. Supp. 1389 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff, 1il 
F.2d 280 (4 Cir. 1973), cert. den. 422 U.S. 1044, the case: 
lied upon by Salt Lake City and the District Court below in 
the present case. It is respectfully submitted that the 
Forsyth case is an aberration and violated the principles 
enunciated in the United States Supreme Court in the cases 
of Near v. Minnesota, supra, and Shuttlesworth v. Ci!J'..£f 
Birmingham, supra, and additionally is out of line with the 
great weight of authority holding that both nuisance abate· 
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ments and license revocations based on prior obscenity vio-
lations are unconstitutional as prior restraints. The 
reasoning of Forsyth is based on the theory that since persons 
convicted of violating obscenity ordinances can be imprisoned 
with incidental infringement of First Amendment rights, 
licenses can be revoked with the "incidental" loss of First 
Amendment rights. This argument misconstrues the law of 
prisoner rights and the meaning of "incidental". It is clear 
that even convicted felons have First Amendment rights which 
may only be curtailed to the extent necessary to protect a 
compeling state interest centering about prison security, 
or a clear and present danger of a breach of prison disci-
pline, or some substantial interference with orderly insti-
tutional administration. E.g., Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 
319 F.Supp 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 
317 F.Supp. 776 (D.R.!. 1970). Therefore, even if an individual 
were imprisoned for an obscenity violation, he could not be 
prevented from continuing to operate a theater on the out-
side. 
A more glaring error by the court in Forsyth was to 
denominate the revocation of a license, to conduct a business 
presumptively protected by the First Amendment, as an "inci-
dental" loss of rights. The curtailment of rights of prisoners 
may be incidental to an overriding necessity to protect prison 
security, for example. If the purpose was simply to stifle 
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the expression of the prisoner as part of th · hin 
e punis ent, 1 
would not be 11 incidental 11 to a legitimate purpose but a 
dire9t attack on the prisoner's First Amendment rights. 
The shutting down of the Gallery Theater is the ~obj, 
-.. 
of the City's action complained of here. It is not rntreli 
incidental to some other overriding legitimate purpose. 
In closing, this admonition from the Supreme Court in 
the case of Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. vs. Conrad, 420 
U.S. 546, 95 S. Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed. 448 (1975) should be 
remembered: 
[A] free society prefers to punish the 
few who abuse rights of speech after they 
break the law than to throttle them and 
all others beforehand. It is always diffi-
cult to know in advance what an individual 
will say, and the line between legitimate 
and illegitimate speech is often so finely 
drawn that the risks of freewheeling 
censorship are formidable. 420 U.S. at 559, 
95 S. Ct. 1239, 1246; 43 L.Ed.2d at 459 
(1975). 
The defendants may punish plaintiff and its agentscy 
fines and imprisonment for abusing their First Amendment 
rights. The defendants may also prevent the exhibition of 
specific films which are obscene and hence outside the 
protection of the First Amendment. However, the First All~ 
ment clearly prohibits the total suppression of the exhibi~ 
of all films whether this suppression is attempted by liceJi 
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suspension, restraining order, "nuisance abatement" or 
otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the District Court below erred 
in granting respondents' motion for summary judgment and 
denying appellant's petition for extraordinary relief and it 
is respectfully submitted that this Court should reverse the 
Order and direct the District Court to grant appellant relief 
necessary to protect its rights under the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 
·71w~::zr 
;::;;-~. 0 I CONNELL 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) copies of 
the foregoing upon the attorney for the respondents, Roger 
Cutler, by leaving same at the Salt Lake City Attorney's 
Office, 101 City & County Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on the ~~~day of May, 1978. 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OGDEN CITY and WEBER COUNTY, / 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EAGLE BOOKS, et. al., 
Defendants. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 67644 
This matter is presented to the Court on Motions for 
Summary Judgment on the part of plaintiffs and defendants. 
The Complaint in this action is a two-cause complaint; the 
first cause of action alleging that the defendants have 
committed the crime of distribution of pornographic mater-
ials and is therefore a public nuisance, with a prayer 
that they be permanently enjoined from further maintaining 
the nuisance and that the defendants be enjoined to surrender 
to the Sheriff of Weber County any material which is subject 
to this action to be destroyed by the Sheriff, and that an 
accounting be made of all monies and other considerations paid 
as admission to view any materials determined to create a 
public nuisance and that said monies be paid to the general 
fund of Weber County. The second cause of action requests 
that the defendants be permanently restrained from doing 
business without a license within Ogden City, Weber County, 
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Utah. Defendants claim that the license revocation and 
nuisance action are unconstitutional. 
Constitutional provision in question is the First Arne~ 
ment which states "Congress shall make no law respecting t 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercis, 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the prt; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances." The 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United Sta: 
in part states "No state shall make or enforce any law whk 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of: 
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person ofL 
liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny t: 
any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the 
law." 
The First Amendment has been ruled to apply to the sta' 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Section 76-10-803, Utah Code Annotated, defines publii 
nuisance as follows: "(l) A public nuisance is a crimear! 
the order and economy of the State and consists in unlawful 
doing any act or omitting to perform any duty, which act 
or omission either: •.• (b) offends public decency." Sectio: 
76-10-1210(3) states: "The commission of a crime under th;; 
part shall be deemed to offend public decency (this part v.. 
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mean Chapter 12 which covers the sale of pornography). 
Pornography is not protected by the First Amendment. 
There has been approximately 30 sales which has been determined 
by the courts to be pornographic material. As to each of those 
sales under the Utah Code, each sale could be determined to 
offend public decency. Each sale therefore under the defini-
tion of the Statute could be construed to be a public nuisance. 
As to each of the volumes adjudicated to be pornographic, 
the relief requested by the City could be granted; that is 
each of the volumes ruled to be pornographic could be enjoined 
from further sale and the additional volumes of that particu-
lar book found to be pornographic could be ordered surrendered 
to the Sheriff and the receipts forfeited. If this were the 
relief requested by plaintiffs, it could possibly be con-
stitutionally permissible because pornographic material is 
not protected by the First Amendment. However, the relief 
requested by plaintiffs is that because defendants have made 
a sale or sales of books determined to be pornographic that 
they be enjoined from any and all further sales and that they 
be enjoined to surrender to the Sheriff of Weber County any 
material which is subject to this action which would be their 
total inventory, so that their total inventory could be des-
troyed and that an accounting be made of all monies and other 
considerations paid as admission to view the materials be for-
-3-
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feited to the general fund of Weber County. 
I do not interpret the Statute in question to be that 
broad. After having studied the briefs of the parties and: 
cases cited therein, I rule as follows in regard to injunct. 
and public nuisance: the injunction provisions of 76-1~~ 
is limited to enjoining distribution of specific pieces of 
material which have been ruled to be pornographic and there· 
fore not protected by the First Amendment. The statutory 
provision cannot be used to enjoin the operation of a book· 
store per se. Such injunctive relief would be a prior rut 
of material not judged to be pornographic. This is the ess; 
of censorship and book-burning. The injunctive relief as 
requested by the City would not be constitutionally perrniss: 
under the First Amendment. It would be an unconstitutional 
prior restraint which must be distinguished from constitufr 
restraint of materials which have been judged to be porno-
graphic under the standards established by the Supreme Cour'. 
Therefore as to the plaintiffs' first cause of action, dr 
fendants are granted summary judgment. 
As to plaintiffs' second cause of action in regard to 
enjoining defendants from doing business without a license, 
defendants contend that the revocation of their license is 
also prior restraint and therefore unconstitutional. 
Plaintiffs' request an injunction but cite no authMll 
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statutory or case law which would authorize such relief. The 
ordinance carries its own sanctions for violation - a daily 
misdemeanor. There is no authority for a restraining order 
and there does not appear to be a need. The sanctions of 
the ordinance are greater than the sanctions of contempt. 
The injunctive relief requested in plaintiffs' second cause 
of action is denied and defendants are granted summary judg-
ment. 
The question of constitutionality of the ordinance does 
not appear to be properly before this Court in this case. 
It is not necessary to the decision and a ruling thereon would 
at best be advisory only. 
DATED this 20th day of October, 1977. 
/s/ 
RONALD O. HYDE, JUDGE 
[Emphasis Added] 
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